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Enlightening Communities and Parents for Improving Student Learning 
Evidence from Randomized Experiment in Niger*  
 
Eiji Kozuka† 
 
Abstract 
Providing local communities with authority to manage school resources is a popular education 
policy in the developing world. However, recent studies suggest that this type of intervention 
has limited impact on student learning outcomes. To investigate how communities can 
effectively utilize school resources, we conducted a randomized experiment in Niger by 
providing school grants and training for school committees to increase communities’ 
awareness of student learning and improve resource management. The result shows that, when 
the training was conducted with grant provision, communities increased activities that 
enhanced student effort, and student test scores in math and French remarkably improved, 
particularly for low-performing children. As a secondary effect of the training, parents, who 
have realized their children are not learning the basics at school, increased their contribution to 
school committees and their support for children’s home study. These results suggest that 
sharing information and knowledge with communities and raising their awareness is a key to 
enhancing effectiveness of community participation and school grants policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Improving student learning is an imperative challenge for the developing world. While primary 
school enrollment has considerably improved in the last two decades, more than 250 million 
children in the world are not learning basic literacy and numeracy skills, whether they go to 
school or not (UNESCO 2014). During this period, a number of developing countries have 
adopted a policy to decentralize authority in school management from the government to the 
school-level agents including local communities and parents. Providing school grants is an 
intervention often implemented under this initiative 1 , where school committees and local 
communities are given power to manage the grants. This decentralization policy is expected to 
improve educational outcomes and parental satisfaction since it gives a voice and power to local 
stakeholders who know more the need on the ground than central-level agents (Barrera-Osorio et 
al. 2009; Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011).  
This paper examines how schools and communities can manage school grants for 
improving student learning in Niger. To evaluate the intervention, we conducted a large field 
experiment in collaboration with a program called “Ecole pour Tous (EPT),” or “School for All” 
project. EPT is a program in education that involves the participation of the community, which 
has been jointly implemented by Niger’s Federal Ministry of Education and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) since 2004, originally aiming at making school committees 
function effectively. In the EPT’s initial model, school committee members are selected by a 
secret ballot election, in which any adult residents within the school district can participate. 
Through the committee’s facilitation, the community and school work together to develop and 
implement an annual school improvement plan using the community’s own resources. While 
this model has been successful in enhancing community participation and improving access to 
                                            
1 Another important policy implemented in this period is fee-free education. In many countries, school 
grants were introduced to make up for the funds that were previously collected from parents (Lugaz and 
Grauwe 2016).  
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primary education, and has been expanded into neighboring countries such as Senegal, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, and Côte d'Ivoire, there was still space for further refinement to improve the quality 
of education. 
In our experiment, EPT introduced two additional interventions into the initial model: 
school grants and training for effective resource management to improve learning. In this 
training, school committee members learn how to make and implement an effective school 
action plan. After the training, school principals conduct a student exam and summarize the 
results for communities to be able to understand it. In the next step, school committees organize 
a community assembly to present the results of the exam and identify what challenges schools 
are facing and how communities can work with schools to improve student learning. To evaluate 
the effectiveness of these interventions, we assigned 180 schools into three groups randomly. 
The first school received school grants only (Grants-only group), the second group had resource 
management training as well as school grants (Grants-plus-Training group), and the third group 
received neither as a control group. After two years from the intervention, we found that the 
Grants-plus-Training schools performed better in math and French exams than the comparison 
and Grants-only schools. While the treatment effect of the Grants-only group was small (or even 
negative) and insignificant, the average effect of the Grants-plus-Training group was 0.41 
standard deviations in math and 0.28 standard deviations in French. Our analysis suggests that 
the resource management training is highly cost-effective, compared to other learning 
interventions. 
In both the Grants-only and the Grants-plus-Training group, grants were utilized to 
purchase textbooks, teacher’s guides, and school supplies, but these inputs alone may not have 
been enough to improve student performance. Differences between the Grants-only and the 
Grants-plus-Training schools were found in after-class studies. A lot of Grants-plus-Training 
students attended remedial classes and night classes which were supported by school committees. 
Students of the Grants-plus-Training schools also did more home study, which were often 
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supported by their older brothers and sisters. These results suggest that the training induced 
school committees and communities to allocate more resources for activities that are effective in 
student learning and that providing information on children’s performance motivated parents to 
encourage their children to study at home. 
Looking at the results by student initial learning level, the effect of the resource 
management training is stronger for lower-performing children than for higher-performing 
children. This heterogeneous impact is explained by the increase in the children’s own and 
families’ efforts: the training induced weaker students to participate in after-class study sessions 
and to study more at home, and encouraged their families to support home studies. 
This study contributes to the literature on three types of education policy popular in the 
developing world: community participation in education (or school-based management), 
increasing school inputs, and information provision. The result is consistent with recent studies 
on the effectiveness of school grants and the other types of school inputs: many studies show that, 
while school inputs can often improve some educational outcomes such as enrollment, inputs 
alone have little impact on student learning (Glewwe et al. 2004; Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin 
2009; Pradhan et al. 2014; Blimpo, Evans and Lahire 2015; Beasley and Huillery 2016). Some 
reviews even conclude that providing school grants is one of the least effective interventions to 
improve student test scores (McEwan 2015; Evans and Popova 2016). 
An important reason behind the limited impact of the school grants is that they are not 
spent effectively due to the low capacity of community members who are responsible for 
managing the grants. In Niger, Beasley and Huillery (2016) provide evidence that the grants are 
utilized for items that do not lead to improving student performance, such as school 
infrastructure and investment in an agricultural project. In Gambia, Blimpo, Evans and Lahire 
(2015) have found that school grants with school management training improved student 
performance in villages with high literacy, but it had even negative results in low literacy 
villages. In Mexico, Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina (2012) also show that grants and 
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training had no impact in extremely poor communities, where parents may lack capacity to voice 
their needs. Another possible reason is that parents reduce involvement in their children’s 
education in response to increased school resources. In the United States, Houtenville and 
Conway (2008) find negative correlation between school resources and parental behavior such 
as discussing with children and attending school meetings, suggesting that school resources 
decrease parental effort for their children’s education. In India and Zambia, Das et al. (2013) find 
that, when schools were given surprise grants, the children’s test scores did improve, but when 
parents anticipated that the grants would come, they decreased household spending in education, 
and their children’s test scores did not improve.  
In many developing countries, where parents have little schooling, how can 
communities and parents manage the school grants to improve student learning? This study 
gives an answer to this question and explores a mechanism that makes community participation 
work. 
Among various types of education intervention, the resource management training in 
our experiment can fall into the category of information intervention, particularly the one that 
provides community and parents with information on student performance. There are mixed 
evidence on the effectiveness of this type of intervention. For example, in India, Banerjee, 
Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2010) find that sharing children’s literacy test scores 
with parents, community members, and teachers at village-wide meetings had no impact. 
Likewise, in Kenya, Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2014) show that providing parents with 
information on their children’s performance had no impact on parental behavior. Meanwhile, in 
Pakistan, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2015) find that providing report cards to parents and 
schools improved test scores. In Mexico, de Hoyos et al. (2017) show that dissemination of 
students’ performance information and diagnostic feedback led to improvement in test scores. 
As suggested by these studies and recent reviews such as Mbiti (2016) and Read and 
Atinc (2017), providing information alone is not enough to improve student learning outcomes, 
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but when parents are given avenue to affect the education system, information can play an 
important role for the improvement. In Niger, our experimental intervention was built into an 
existing school-based management policy, which can make information intervention work 
effectively through active community participation, and therefore produced large impacts. 
This study will further understanding in this area by investigating how parents and 
communities respond to information about student performance. This paper is unique in that it 
examined the effect on both school and home learning environments, while most of related 
researches in developing countries have paid keen attention to the effect on the school side, and 
analyzed how information can strengthen school accountability. As a representative study on this 
issue, Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011) argue that information can affect learning outcomes 
through increasing parents’ school choice, oversight of school teachers, and voice to promote 
better policies. In addition to this aspect, this paper examines how information intervention can 
increase communities’ willingness to support school and to increase parental effort to improve 
home learning environment. While there are several studies on the impact of information 
provision on parent and student effort, 2  few analyze it in the framework of community 
participation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the program 
and the data collection for the evaluation. Section III explains the evaluation methodology and 
section IV presents the impact of the program on student learning outcomes and critical factors 
that can affect student learning such as school committees’ activities, student efforts, and 
parental efforts. The final section makes a conclusion. 
 
                                            
2 For example, in the United States, Bergman (2015) shows that providing information on children’s 
missed assignments and grades increased parent and student effort and improved student learning 
outcomes. In Chile, Berlinski et al. (2016) show that providing parents with information on student 
outcomes by text message improved student effort and learning outcomes.  
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2. The Context and Experimental Design 
Since early 2000, Niger has made remarkable progress in access to primary education. Between 
2000 and 2015, the net primary enrollment ratio increased from 27 percent to 62 percent 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2017). An education initiative implemented during this period 
was establishing new school committees, called Comité de Gestion de l’Ecoles, or COGES. To 
make school committees function effectively, several measures were introduced in this effort. 
First, to gain wide support from communities, school committee members were selected by 
election at the community assembly3. Second, communities were deeply involved in making 
school committees’ annual plan for improving school environment such as constructing and 
repairing classrooms, providing desks and chairs, constructing water facilities, and purchasing 
learning materials for students. In the assembly held in the early school year, parents, local 
residents, school teachers, and students gathered to share information about challenges schools 
are facing, and activities that communities can help in to solve the problems. Based on the 
discussions, school committees made an annual school improvement plan, and communities 
approved the plan in the next assembly. Third, in the original school committee model, the 
annual plan was implemented with locally mobilized resources. At the end of the school year, 
communities reviewed the results of the implementation of the plan (Hara 2011). This initiative 
had been successfully scaled up in Niger until 2008 with assistance from JICA and the World 
Bank (Honda and Kato 2013), and a similar school committee model has been adopted by the 
governments of other Francophone countries such as Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Cote 
d’Ivoire, and is being scaled-up. A recent randomized evaluation in Burkina Faso has shown that 
the program improved educational outcomes such as student enrollment and repetition (Kozuka, 
                                            
3 More precisely, six representatives of the parents’ association are elected by secret ballot at the 
community assembly, and three of them become the school committee members. The other committee 
members are a representative of the mothers’ association, the school principal, a representative of school 
teachers and a representative of students. 
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Sawada, and Todo 2016) and enhanced social capital among school and community members 
(Sawada et al. 2016; Todo, Kozuka, and Sawada 2016). 
While this school committee policy has made significant contribution to the progress in 
Niger’s education, the country is still facing huge challenges in the quality of education. The 
completion rate of primary school is 49 percent, and more seriously, only three percent of 
children complete primary school with sufficient competency in math and science (PASEC 
2015). 
To resolve the situation, Niger’s Federal Ministry of National Education and JICA 
conducted experimental interventions using school grants and training for school committees to 
utilize the additional resources effectively. The experiment was implemented in the Say and 
Torodi districts of the Tillabery region from December 2012 to May 2014. From 328 primary 
schools that existed in the two districts in 2012, we selected 60 schools for the comparison group, 
60 schools for the Grants-only group, and 60 schools for the Grants-plus-Training group. To 
reduce imbalance across groups, we created strata in terms of educational administrative region 
(four regions in Say and three regions in Torodi) and school scale (large-scale or small-scale). 
Before the experiment started, school committees already existed and were conducting 
activities explained above in all the 180 schools including the comparison group. For the 
experimental interventions, EPT first conducted financial training for both the Grants-only 
group and Grants-plus-Training group to ensure appropriate management of the school grants. 
After the financial training, EPT conducted resource management training for the 
Grants-plus-Training group only. In this resource management training, school committee 
members learn how to facilitate a community meeting to provide information on student 
performance and make an effective plan for improving student learning, and are given 
knowledge about important factors for learning, such as classroom hours, school infrastructure 
and learning materials, and the quality of teaching and learning. After this training, schools 
conduct a student exam in math and French and summarize the results. In the next step, 
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committees organize a community assembly to induce communities to be aware of the 
importance of learning and explain the exam results. Even before the intervention, schools 
already had practice providing parents with test score cards, but many parents did not understand 
the numbers written on the card or even did not know the existence of the score cards. EPT 
therefore utilizes the community assembly to enable parents and communities to better 
understand the real situation of student learning. Then, school committees facilitate discussion 
on what communities can do with school grants and their own resources. Based on the result of 
this discussion, school committees make a school improvement plan, and organize the second 
community assembly to gain approval from the community. After the approval, school grants are 
provided to the committees, and the plan is implemented with the grants and the community’s 
own resources. In this experiment, the first financial and resource management trainings were 
conducted in December 2012, and school grants were provided in January 2013. Since this was a 
new intervention, EPT revised training contents based on the results of the first school year, and 
conducted the second financial and resource management trainings for committee members in 
October 20134, and the second grants were provided in November 2013.  
The amount of the grants provided to a school is calculated based on the number of the 
students: If the total student number is 50 or more, the amount for the school is FCFA 2,000 
(US$ 4.05) per student times the total number per year; and if the student number is less than 50, 
the amount provided to the school was FCFA 100,000 (US$ 202) per year. These amounts were 
set taking into account the size of the country’s economy, the public spending in primary 
education5, and future prospects for external assistance6. The total amount provided for 120 
                                            
4 When these grants and training interventions were scaled-up to 2,000 schools in other districts in 2016 
through the support of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and the World Bank, the training was 
conducted only one time since it was not necessary to revise the training contents in the scale-up phase. 
5 In 2012, Niger’s GDP per capita was US$ 391.51 (World Bank 2017), government expenditure on 
primary education was US$ 156 million, and the total enrollment in primary schools was 2 million 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2017). 
6 The same grant formula was utilized when the grants were introduced by GPE and the World Bank’s 
project. 
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schools in the first school year was FCFA 26,846,000 (US$ 54,340), and the total amount in the 
second school year was FCFA 30,066,000 (US$ 60,857)7.  
To evaluate this intervention and understand the mechanism behind the relationship 
between the interventions and student learning, we collected data by conducting student tests in 
math and French and interview surveys. The baseline survey was conducted from November 
through December in 2012, and the end-line survey was conducted in June 2014. The tests were 
conducted for the same children across the surveys, and these children were in the second, the 
third, and the fourth grade at the baseline, and most of them became the third, the fourth, and the 
fifth graders respectively at the end-line exam. The tests were developed and administered by an 
education non-governmental organization (NGO) from Niger, and were designed at students’ 
grade levels, abiding by the national curricula and textbooks. The math tests assessed arithmetic, 
geometric shapes and measures, and logic, and the French tests assessed writing, reading, and 
oral skills. Interviews were conducted with school directors, teachers, school committee 
members, and students’ fathers (or another family member when the father is unavailable). 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
The effects of the two interventions can be estimated by the following equations: 
 
(1)                 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  α + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an outcome of a student i at school j, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a dummy equal to 1 if a school j is 
assigned into the Grants-only group, and received school grants but did not have training for 
                                            
7 The amounts of other experimental grants are US$ 500 per school in Gambia (Blimpo, Evans and 
Lahire 2015), US$ 870 in Indonesia (Pradhan et al. 2014) , US$ 209 per school (US$ 1.83 per student on 
average) in Niger (Beasley and Huillery 2016), and US$ 3,190 per school in Senegal (Carneiro et al. 
2016) . 
 
11 
 
learning, and zero otherwise, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a dummy equal to one if a school j is assigned into 
the Grants-plus-Training group, and received training for learning as well as school grants, and 
zero otherwise, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a vector of control variables, including strata dummies and baseline 
outcome value when available. The parameters of interest are 𝛽𝛽1, which is the average treatment 
effect of the Grants-only intervention, and 𝛽𝛽2, which is the average treatment effect of the 
Grants-plus-Training. 
 
4. Results 
This section first describes school, teacher, and children characteristics at the baseline survey 
and sees the balance between the treatment and the control schools. Then, I estimate the impacts 
on students’ test scores and perceptions on learning math and French, and analyze the effect on 
school committee activities, student effort, and parent effort, which could have affected the test 
scores. Lastly, I present the heterogeneous impact by students’ baseline test scores and the 
cost-effectiveness of the resource management training. 
 
Baseline School and Student Characteristics 
Table 1 shows the baseline school characteristics such as number of students and teachers, 
proportion of female students, female teachers, and contract teachers, and director’s experience. 
We also checked data on supplementary or night classes, which are often conducted in schools 
and communities in Niger. The results of the t-test show that no systematic difference was found 
across the three groups. 
Table 2 presents pretreatment balance of student test scores and students’ perceptions on 
learning math and French. In the interview survey, students are given statements “I enjoy 
learning mathematics (or French)” and “I usually do well in mathematics (or French)” and are 
asked to evaluate it by “5 = strongly agree,” “4 = agree,” “3 = neither agree or disagree,” “2 = 
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disagree,” or “1 = strongly disagree.” We report estimates of 𝛽𝛽1 (Grants-only school) and 𝛽𝛽2 
(Grants-plus-Training school) in equation (1), where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is replaced by baseline outcome values. 
The result shows that these outcomes also have no systematic differences among the three 
groups. 
Table 3 presents pretreatment balance of school committees’ activities. As explained in 
the second section, even without the experimental interventions, school committees in Niger 
conduct various activities with schools’ and communities’ own resources, and we divided these 
activities into 14 categories. Estimation methodology is same as in table 2, using equation (1). 
The result shows that these outcomes also have no systematic differences among the three 
groups. 
Classroom (column 1) is an activity to build or repair classrooms and is frequently 
implemented by school committees in Niger. Furniture (column 2) is to make or purchase school 
furniture such as desks and chairs. Textbook (column 3) and School Supply (column 4) are to 
purchase textbooks and stationaries for students. Teacher Training (column 5) and Teacher 
Guide (column 6) are to support schools in conducting training and providing guidebooks for 
teachers. Awareness (column 7) is an activity implemented for parents to understand the 
importance of education and encourage parents to send their children to school. Night Class 
(column 8) is an activity to support students’ night study, which is conducted during evenings as 
out-of-school activities because parents think that regular class hours are not enough for their 
children’s learning. To support this activity, school committees buy night lamps and oil for the 
lamps. Supplemental class (column 9) is an activity to support a school to implement 
supplemental lessons outside of school hours, usually on Thursday afternoons or on Saturdays, 
and school committees sometimes provide tuition fee for teachers. Tutoring (column 10) is 
teaching for individual students. Student Attendance (column 11) and Teacher Attendance 
(column 12) are activities to monitor students’ and teachers’ attendance. Practice Exam (column 
13) is an activity conducted for sixth graders to practice an exam for preparing for graduation 
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examination. Student Award (column 14) is an activity to give an award to students who had 
excellent performance. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates show that most activities 
have no systematic difference across groups, except Night Class and Student Award before the 
interventions. 
 
Student Test Scores and Perceptions in Math and French 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the effect on student test scores in math and French one and half 
years after the intervention started. Results show that, while grants alone did not improve student 
learning, additional training improved student test scores in both math and French, except fourth 
graders’ French. The average test score of the Grants-only group students was 0.01 standard 
deviations higher in math and 0.07 standard deviations lower in French, relative to the 
comparison group students’ test score, and the difference is statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, 
the average score of the Grants-plus-Training group students was 0.41 standard deviations 
higher in math and 0.28 standard deviations higher in French, compared to the comparison group 
students’ test score. 
Table 5 estimates program impact on student perceptions on learning math and French. 
The first and the second columns show that there was no impact on how much students like math 
and French. This result is not surprising, since the mean in math and French of the comparison 
group was 4.72 and 4.58 out of 5, respectively, which means that most of the comparison group 
students answered that they liked math and French very much, and therefore, it is difficult to 
detect the difference across the groups.  
The third and the forth columns show that students of the Grants-plus-Training group 
increased confidence in learning. At the end-line, the mean of the comparison group was 3.23 in 
math and 3.16 in French; the mean of the Grants-only group was 3.30 in math and 3.05 in 
French; and the mean of the Grants-plus-Training group was 3.62 in math (nearly 10% more 
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than the mean of the comparison group) and 3.42 in French (nearly 8% more than the mean of 
the comparison group). 
 
School Committee Activities 
Table 6 reports how the interventions affected varieties of school committee’s activities. The 
estimates show that both grants alone and Grants-plus-Training increase purchasing textbooks 
and school supplies: in comparison schools, around 40 percent of committees purchased 
textbooks (column 3), around 50 percent of committees invested in school supplies (column 4), 
and around 30 percent of committees invested in teachers’ guides (column 6); on the other hand, 
in both Grants-only group and Grants-plus-Training schools, more than 90 percent of the 
committees purchased textbooks, more than 80 percent of committees purchased school supplies, 
and more than 80 percent of committees bought teachers’ guides. However, the poor result on 
student learning in the Grants-only group suggests that these additional inputs have little impact 
on student learning. 
The difference between the Grants-only group and the Grants-plus-Training group is 
found in activities on supplementary class (column 8), night class (column 9), tutoring (column 
10), and student award (column 14). For example, while around 50 percent of comparison school 
committees and Grants-only committees invested in supplementary classes, more than 80 
percent of Grants-plus-Training committees supported supplementary classes. Regarding night 
classes, although the percentage of the Grants-only group that did the activity is around 25 
percent more than that of comparison committees, the percentage of the Grants-plus-Training 
committees is 43 percent more than that of comparison committees. The high performance of 
student learning at the Grants-plus-Training schools can be partly attributed to these activities. 
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Student Effort 
Table 7 estimates how student study has changed after the intervention. The first and the second 
columns show how much percentage of students attended supplemental and night classes. These 
results suggest that Grants-plus-Training increases student attendance in supplemental and night 
classes, and are consistent with the results of school committee activities in table 6, where 
Grants-plus-Training increased support for these classes. The third column shows that 
Grants-plus-Training increases student home study by 0.45 hour, while Grants-only has little 
impact. The fourth column indicates that this home study is supported by a family member, 
mostly by older brothers and sisters according to our interview survey.  
 
Parental Effort 
Table 8 displays how much parents contribute to and participate in school committees’ activities 
and are engaged in their children’s education. The first column shows that comparison school 
parents, Grants-only parents, and Grants-plus-Training parents contribute around FCFA 1,750, 
FCFA 1,790, and FCFA 2,250 on average to their school committees, respectively. Although the 
difference between the comparison and Grants-only groups is insignificant, the 
Grants-plus-training parents pay almost 30 percent more than the comparison group parents, and 
the difference is significant. Grants-plus-Training parents also make more commitment to school 
committees’ activities in terms of the attendance to school committee meetings. Parental 
participation rate in community meetings, which are organized by school committees four times 
in a year, also increased in Grants-plus-Training. The average attendance rate of the comparison 
group is 2.25 times, and that of the Grants-plus-Training parents is about 10 percent more than 
that of comparison parents. 
In our interview survey with parents, we asked them whether they received test score 
cards from their children’s school, and, if the answer is yes, we asked parents whether they 
discussed about the performance with their children and teachers. The third column indicates 
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that Grants-plus-Training induces parents to discuss with their children. The fourth column 
shows that five percent more parents discuss with teachers on their children’s performance at the 
Grants-plus-Training group than parents of the comparison group, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Heterogeneous Impact by Baseline Test Scores 
Table 9 presents heterogeneous impact on student test scores by dividing the students into 
quintiles, based on the average test scores at the baseline survey. The effect of the resource 
management training is largest for the lowest-performing children (0.61 standard deviations), 
and is positive and statistically significant for both the second lowest-performing children (0.39 
standard deviations) and the middle-performing children (0.39 standard deviations). Although 
the effect is also positive for the highest-performing children (0.19 standard deviations) and the 
second highest-performing children (0.14 standard deviations), it is not statistically significant. 
To explore the reason of this heterogeneity, Table 10 displays the effects on children’s 
study behavior by the same quintile. Looking at the mean of the comparison group of panels A-D, 
higher-performing children tend to attend more remedial and night classes, and study more at 
home, and their families tend to help the children’s home studies. OLS estimates suggest that the 
training intervention induced lower-performing children to attend more classes and study more 
at home, and their families to support children’s home study. These behavioral responses can 
explain the improvement in the test scores of low-performing children. 
 
Cost-effectiveness 
This section discusses the cost-effectiveness of the resource management training. For the 
calculation, I utilized the methodology described by Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who provide a 
comprehensive way to calculate intervention costs and impact for the purpose of comparing 
cost-effectiveness of different programs.  
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The total cost to implement this training intervention for sixty schools was US$ 24,790,8 
which includes (i) training for school committee members (US$ 17,383); (ii) monitoring of 
school activities (US$ 224); (iii) staff salaries (US$ 4,759); and (iv) communities’ contributions9 
(US$ 2,424). Following Pradhan et al. (2014), this does not include the cost of the grant 
provision, and the impact in this calculation is the effect of the resource management training 
alone, calculated by subtracting the effect of the grants from the effect of grants plus training. 
Using this calculation, the resource management training increased the overall test score 
by 9.13 standard deviations per every US$ 100 spent, math scores by 9.16 standard deviations 
per US$ 100, and French scores by 8.02 standard deviations per US$ 100.10 This indicates that 
the resource management training is a highly cost-effective intervention to improve learning 
compared to other interventions cited in Kremer, Brannen, and Glennerster (2013) .11 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of school grants and training for school committees to increase 
communities’ awareness of student learning and improve resource management. The study finds 
                                            
8 The training and grant provision were implemented from 2012 through 2013, and I used 10 % 
discount rate for the cost and impact in 2013 as suggested by Dhaliwal et al. (2014). The cost per school 
is reduced when the intervention is scaled up, since the training was conducted two times (pilot and 
complementary training) in the experiment, while it is conducted only one time when scaling-up. Since 
one time training may not guarantee the same impact, the cost for the second training is included in this 
analysis, following Dhaliwal et al. (2014)’s suggestion. Therefore, the training intervention can be more 
cost-effective than this estimation in the scaling-up phase depending on the impact gained. 
9 Dhaliwal et al. (2014) recommend including the cost to beneficiaries. 
10 Another way often utilized for showing cost-effectiveness is cost per tenth of standard deviation per 
child. Using this calculation method, the resource management training costs US$ 0.98 per tenth of 
standard deviation per child. However, methodologies to calculate the cost-effectiveness are slightly 
different among papers. 
11 Among 30 primary education programs cited in this review, four programs gained larger standard 
deviations per US$ 100 than our intervention: providing earnings information in Madagascar (Nguyen 
2008); tracking by achievement in Kenya (Duflo et al. 2011), hiring contract teachers instead of civil 
service in Kenya (Duflo et al. 2015); and election of school committee members and linking with village 
authorities (Pradhan et al. 2014). However, careful attention to the context is necessary when comparing 
the cost-effectiveness since the goals of interventions and the meaning of a standard deviation can be 
different among experiments as Kremer, Brannen, and Glennerster (2013) noted. 
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that providing monetary grants alone has limited impact on student performance. School grants 
were utilized to purchase textbooks, teacher’s guides, and school supplies, but these inputs may 
not have been utilized effectively when communities have little knowledge on learning outcome. 
This result is consistent with previous studies which conclude that providing school inputs such 
as monetary grants, textbooks, or teaching materials is not sufficient to improve learning. 
However, by conducting additional training for school committees, student test scores in math 
and French have remarkably increased, particularly for low-performing children. 
Compared to other educational interventions that have been tested in the developing 
world, the resource management training is cost-effective for improving learning. This is 
primarily because the effect sizes are large (see McEwan 2015 for a review of other 
interventions), rather than because the cost is low. A possible reason for this large impact is that 
the intervention activated several channels that enhanced student learning. First, by providing 
schools and communities with knowledge on effective resource management, they have 
promoted after-class studies that directly increase study hours and an activity that motivates 
students to study more. Second, by providing information about student performance at the 
community assembly, communities have realized that most children were not learning the basics 
at school, and they were motivated to increase their contribution to school committee activities. 
Third, parents have taken more interest in their children’s study and did more discussion with 
teachers and children, and provided more support for their children’s home studies. 
Several policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, school grant program 
can produce huge impact with complementary interventions that can overcome the weakness of 
community participation. Even when communities do not have enough capacity, school inputs 
can be effectively utilized by providing knowledge on means for improving learning. Also, 
reduction of parental efforts in response to school inputs can be mitigated by raising awareness 
on their children’s learning. Second, it matters how information reaches parents. Even when 
student report cards are provided, parents may not understand it if they have little schooling and 
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are illiterate. By providing an opportunity for parents to understand the real level of their 
children’s learning, parents will be motivated to increase their efforts for their children’s learning. 
However, careful attention is necessary when individual information is provided, since it can 
widen the gap between stronger and weaker children if parents tend to invest more in the 
former.12 Third, while the result of the resource management training is notable, particularly in 
that it benefits low-performing children and can prevent widening the gap from high-performing 
children, this intervention alone may face a limit as children’s overall learning level advances, 
since its effect is relatively weak for higher-level children. Acknowledging the necessity of 
additional interventions, EPT and JICA have introduced “Math Drills” and “Learning Camps” in 
their programs in Niger and Madagascar. “Math Drills” were developed based on math 
workbooks utilized in Japan’s math education; and “Learning Camps” is a literacy intervention 
originally developed by Pratham, an Indian education NGO, and proved highly effective in 
improving children’s literacy skills in India (Banerjee et al. 2016). In fact, any one prescription is 
not enough to overcome the formidable learning challenges in the developing world. We need to 
exert continuous efforts to mobilize existing evidence as well as to accumulate new evidence for 
fighting the learning crisis. 
 
                                            
12 Studies of Akresh, Bagby, de Walque, and Kazianga (2012) and Dizon-Ross (2016) suggest that 
parents invest more in higher ability children’s education than lower ability children’s education in 
Burkina Faso and Malawi, respectively. 
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Table 1: Pretreatment Balance on School Characteristics  
  (1) (2) (3) 
p-Value 
(1) = (2) 
p-Value 
(1) = (3)   Comparison Grants Grants 
plus 
Training 
Number of students per 
school 90.60 101.51 106.90 0.44 0.29 
Number of teachers per 
school 3.90 4.10 4.18 0.72 0.63 
Student-teacher ratio 26.10 27.71 27.20 0.51 0.61 
Proportion of female students 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.97 0.19 
Proportion of female teachers 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.25 0.63 
Proportion of contract 
teachers 0.83 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.11 
Director's experience in years 6.70 6.46 6.04 0.79 0.47 
Conduct supplementary or 
night classes 0.66 0.71 0.64 0.55 0.85 
            
 
  
 
24 
 
Table 2: Pretreatment Balance on Student Test Scores and Perceptions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Overall Test Score 
Math Test 
Score 
French Test 
Score Like Math Like French 
Confident in 
Math 
Confident in 
French 
Grants 0.069 0.019 0.141 0.075 0.047 0.009 0.053 
  (0.105) (0.106) (0.122) (0.074) (0.071) (0.250) (0.189) 
Grants plus Training -0.113 -0.105 -0.099 0.012 0.003 -0.193 0.123 
  (0.097) (0.100) (0.109) (0.080) (0.077) (0.228) (0.167) 
                
Observations 4,328 4,330 4,492 4,349 4,369 4,443 4,171 
R-squared 0.072 0.060 0.064 0.044 0.046 0.039 0.032 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.462 4.478 3.477 2.898 
 
Notes: Test scores are normalized so that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group are zero and one. Overall test score is the average of the normalized 
test scores in math and French of each student. Columns 4/5 and 6/7 show how much students agree with the statements “I enjoy learning mathematics/ French,” and “I 
do well in mathematics/ French,” respectively, and the answers are coded by “5 = strongly agree,” “4 = agree,” “3 = neither agree or disagree,” “2 = disagree,” or “1 = 
strongly disagree.” Strata and grade dummies are included in all estimations but are not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and are in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3: Pretreatment Balance on School Committees’ Activities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Classroom Furniture Textbook School Supply Teacher Training Teacher Guide Awareness 
                
Grants -0.067 0.050 0.033 -0.033 -0.083 -0.000 0.167* 
  (0.075) (0.048) (0.088) (0.086) (0.077) (0.084) (0.090) 
Grants plus Training -0.037 -0.000 -0.093 -0.027 0.019 -0.076 0.125 
  (0.071) (0.040) (0.085) (0.090) (0.083) (0.087) (0.089) 
                
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 
R-squared 0.067 0.070 0.186 0.117 0.039 0.172 0.085 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.833 0.050 0.467 0.450 0.250 0.433 0.550 
                
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES 
Supplemental 
Class Night Class Tutoring Student Attendance Teacher Attendance Practice Exam Student Award 
                
Grants -0.000 0.150* -0.087 0.050 -0.033 -0.067 0.117 
  (0.090) (0.086) (0.065) (0.074) (0.083) (0.080) (0.092) 
Grants plus Training -0.041 0.038 -0.033 0.012 -0.041 0.020 0.006 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.070) (0.076) (0.084) (0.083) (0.091) 
                
Observations 179 179 178 179 179 179 179 
R-squared 0.076 0.126 0.055 0.109 0.099 0.186 0.063 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.633 0.350 0.186 0.767 0.717 0.333 0.383 
Notes: Strata dummies are included in all estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Effect on Test Scores 
    Overall Test Score   Math Test Score   French Test Score 
VARIABLES   All Grades Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5   All Grades Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5   All Grades Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 
                                
Grants   -0.052 0.008 -0.004 -0.159   0.009 0.093 0.001 -0.058   -0.073 -0.064 0.053 -0.203 
    (0.092) (0.118) (0.116) (0.141)   (0.104) (0.134) (0.139) (0.172)   (0.091) (0.123) (0.120) (0.135) 
Grants plus Training   0.343*** 0.465*** 0.218* 0.358**   0.405*** 0.530*** 0.356** 0.365**   0.275*** 0.415** 0.087 0.327** 
    (0.087) (0.143) (0.128) (0.139)   (0.102) (0.160) (0.171) (0.163)   (0.090) (0.164) (0.112) (0.133) 
Baseline Test Score   0.428*** 0.346*** 0.449*** 0.515***   0.399*** 0.321*** 0.426*** 0.460***   0.319*** 0.297*** 0.313*** 0.391*** 
    (0.038) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)   (0.038) (0.052) (0.058) (0.064)   (0.036) (0.065) (0.060) (0.042) 
                                
Observations   3,572 1,223 1,148 1,201   3,573 1,223 1,149 1,201   3,707 1,279 1,205 1,223 
R-squared   0.238 0.211 0.286 0.338   0.204 0.168 0.285 0.284   0.153 0.165 0.147 0.279 
 
Notes: Test scores are normalized so that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group are zero and one. Overall test score is the average of the normalized 
test scores in math and French of each student. Strata and grade dummies are included in all estimations but are not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
school level and are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5: Effect on Student Perceptions on Math and French 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Like Math Like French Confident in Math 
Confident in 
French 
          
Grants -0.040 -0.120 -0.003 -0.106 
  (0.045) (0.095) (0.145) (0.154) 
Grants plus Training 0.026 0.046 0.324** 0.261* 
  (0.046) (0.083) (0.140) (0.137) 
Baseline Perception 0.046* 0.001 -0.006 0.006 
  (0.026) (0.038) (0.026) (0.033) 
          
Observations 3,585 3,591 3,677 3,449 
R-squared 0.033 0.048 0.071 0.098 
Mean in comparison schools 4.718 4.575 3.299 3.160 
 
Notes: Columns 1/2 and 3/4 show how much students agree with the statements “I enjoy learning 
mathematics/ French,” and “I do well in mathematics/ French,” respectively, and the answers are coded by “5 
= strongly agree,” “4 = agree,” “3 = neither agree or disagree,” “2 = disagree,” or “1 = strongly disagree.” 
Strata dummies are included in all estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
school level and are in parentheses.   
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6: Effect on School Committees’ Activities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Classroom Furniture Textbook School Supply Teacher Training Teacher Guide Awareness 
                
Grants 0.074 0.087 0.502*** 0.376*** 0.047 0.457*** -0.020 
  (0.079) (0.054) (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.081) (0.092) 
Grants plus Training 0.106 0.068 0.486*** 0.376*** 0.023 0.494*** -0.058 
  (0.077) (0.051) (0.079) (0.080) (0.071) (0.082) (0.090) 
                
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 
R-squared 0.108 0.085 0.325 0.253 0.101 0.275 0.128 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.712 0.051 0.390 0.458 0.169 0.305 0.559 
                
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES 
Supplemental 
Class Night Class Tutoring Student Attendance Teacher Attendance Practice Exam Student Award 
                
Grants 0.082 0.246*** 0.102 -0.028 -0.073 0.017 0.072 
  (0.088) (0.084) (0.062) (0.089) (0.090) (0.069) (0.080) 
Grants plus Training 0.329*** 0.434*** 0.142** -0.084 -0.008 0.024 0.302*** 
  (0.082) (0.083) (0.064) (0.089) (0.088) (0.069) (0.084) 
                
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 
R-squared 0.202 0.262 0.127 0.143 0.158 0.115 0.243 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.475 0.305 0.085 0.559 0.508 0.169 0.254 
 
Notes: Strata dummies and baseline outcome variables are included in all estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7: Effect on Student Study 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Attend 
Remedial 
Class 
Attend Night 
Class 
Study Hours at 
Home 
Family Helps 
Home Study 
          
Grants 0.054 0.041 0.030 -0.003 
  (0.067) (0.061) (0.136) (0.047) 
Grants plus Training 0.236*** 0.150** 0.450*** 0.108*** 
  (0.070) (0.062) (0.146) (0.039) 
          
Observations 2,781 3,199 3,455 3,274 
R-squared 0.142 0.187 0.062 0.092 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.292 0.344 1.389 0.551 
          
 
Notes: Strata dummies are included in all estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the school level and are in parentheses.   
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 8: Effect on Parental Effort 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Contribution to 
committee 
(FCFA) 
Attendance of 
committee meeting Discuss with child Discuss with teacher 
          
Grants 42.979 0.078 0.036 -0.005 
  (219.320) (0.111) (0.040) (0.045) 
Grants plus Training 502.794* 0.227** 0.085** 0.051 
  (276.305) (0.115) (0.037) (0.039) 
          
Observations 1,978 2,331 1,949 1,949 
R-squared 0.052 0.064 0.048 0.057 
Mean in comparison 
schools 1748.702 2.257 0.758 0.686 
 
Notes: Strata dummies are included in all estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level 
and are in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 9: Effect on Test Scores by Quintile of Baseline Test Scores 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Overall Test Score 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
            
Grants 0.070 0.098 0.075 -0.213* -0.248 
  (0.101) (0.099) (0.109) (0.117) (0.162) 
Grants plus Training 0.605*** 0.387*** 0.393*** 0.144 0.188 
  (0.112) (0.100) (0.106) (0.122) (0.180) 
Baseline Test Score 0.641** 0.054 -0.080 0.687*** 0.341*** 
  (0.264) (0.295) (0.227) (0.183) (0.078) 
            
Observations 723 675 717 717 740 
R-squared 0.231 0.126 0.130 0.097 0.173 
 
Notes: Students are divided by quintile of the baseline test scores, from lowest (Quintile 1) through 
highest (Quintile 5), and are aggregated over all grades. Overall test score is the average of the 
normalized test scores in math and French of each student. Strata and grade dummies are included 
in all estimations but are not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and are 
in parentheses. Results are aggregated over three grades and two subjects. 
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 10: Effect on Student Study by Quintile of Baseline Test Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Overall Test Score 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Panel A:  Attend Remedial 
Class         
Grants 0.127 0.070 0.034 -0.044 -0.018 
  (0.084) (0.100) (0.084) (0.088) (0.091) 
Grants plus Training 0.430*** 0.255** 0.210** 0.115 0.106 
  (0.082) (0.105) (0.089) (0.091) (0.098) 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.192 0.255 0.265 0.358 0.391 
            
Panel B: Attend Night Class         
Grants 0.062 0.115 0.031 0.017 -0.100 
  (0.083) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.103) 
Grants plus Training 0.280*** 0.213*** 0.107 0.168** 0.012 
  (0.085) (0.074) (0.084) (0.072) (0.110) 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.263 0.206 0.369 0.330 0.553 
            
Panel C: Study Hours at Home         
Grants -0.158 -0.028 0.176 0.127 -0.091 
  (0.170) (0.177) (0.187) (0.200) (0.235) 
Grants plus Training 0.508** 0.566*** 0.466** 0.176 0.419 
  (0.221) (0.193) (0.211) (0.206) (0.287) 
Mean in comparison 
schools 1.282 1.337 1.308 1.433 1.631 
            
Panel D: Family Helps Student Study       
Grants -0.017 0.061 -0.060 -0.025 -0.117* 
  (0.081) (0.071) (0.062) (0.065) (0.064) 
Grants plus Training 0.253*** 0.149** 0.015 0.057 0.014 
  (0.070) (0.067) (0.059) (0.067) (0.055) 
Mean in comparison 
schools 0.473 0.495 0.584 0.578 0.614 
            
 
Notes: Students are divided by quintile of the baseline test scores, from lowest (Quintile 1) through 
highest (Quintile 5), and are aggregated over all grades. Strata dummies are included in all 
estimations but not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and are in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.  * Significant at 10% level. 
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Abstract (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
2000 年以降、多くの途上国で、地域住民が学校のリソースを管理する教育政策が導入
されてきた。しかし、近年の研究は、この種の政策が児童の学力向上にあまり効果的
でないことを示唆している。本研究では、地域住民が学校の資金を効果的に活用する
ための施策を検討するため、ニジェールにおいてランダム化比較試験（Randomized 
Controlled Trial: RCT）を実施し、地域住民を代表する学校委員会に学校補助金を供
与するとともに、地域住民が児童の学習に対する意識を高め、資金の活用方法を改善
するための研修を実施した。その結果、補助金の供与だけでは学力への効果が見られ
なかったが、研修を併せて実施することにより、課外学習など児童の努力を促す活動
が増加し、児童のテストスコア（算数、フランス語）が大幅に向上した。また、子ど
もが基本的なスキルを身につけていないことに親が気づき、親の学校への貢献や家庭
における学習支援が増加するという副次的な効果も見られた。この研究結果から、住
民参加や学校補助金政策の有効性を高めるためには、地域住民に情報や知識を共有し
課題に対する意識を高めることが重要であると示唆される。 
 
キーワード : 教育、地方分権、アカウンタビリティ、フィールド実験 
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